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to the detriment of efficient performance of their judicial duties. A
further consequence would be the frustration of the primary objective sought by creation of administrative agencies, i.e., to provide
for disposition of specialized and complicated problems by agencies
equipped with expert knowledge and experience essential to more
efficient disposition of such problems.
JERRY M). TRA M MELL

Admiralty-Recovery of Counsel Fees as Damages in
Maintenance and Cure Actions
In Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp.1 the libellant, a seaman with
an extended history of back trouble, brought six consolidated admiralty actions against shipowners for maintenance and cure. Although it was impossible to establish the origin of the seaman's
back condition, it was established that the libellant had had separate
attacks while aboard different ships, followed by periods of remission sufficient to make him fit for duty. The owners of the ships
upon which an attack occurred were found to be primarily liable for
the seaman's maintenance until he again became fit for duty. The
owners of the ships upon which the seaman became ill or disabled
due to an attack that had occurred on a previous ship, but from
which the seaman had not yet obtained maximum cure, were held to
be secondarily liable for the libellant's maintenance. In each of the
claims for maintenance and cure, the recovery of counsel fees was
allowed as an element of damages. Secondarily liable shipowners
were even awarded recovery from primarily liable shipowners of
counsel fees that the former were obligated to pay the seaman.
Traditionally, counsel fees have not been an element of recovery
for maintenance and cure actions.' However, in 1962, the United
States Supreme Court in the historic decision of Vaughan v. Atkinson,8 a maintenance and cure action, awarded counsel fees to the
1256 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1966).

'In maintenance and cure claims, the courts have allowed consequential
damages, Sims v. United States of America War Shipping Administration,
186 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951); and necessary
expenses, Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
*369 U.S. 527 (1962), reversing 291 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1961), 200 F.
Supp. 802 (E.D. Va. 1959).
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libellant as an element of damage.4 In that case, the seaman entered
a United States Public Health Service Hospital five days after the
termination of a voyage aboard the respondent shipowner's vessel.
For approximately three months, he was treated as an inpatient for
suspected tuberculosis. After being discharged, he was treated as
an outpatient for two years before again being declared fit for duty.
Shortly after being admitted, the libellant forwarded to the owner's
agent an abstract of his clinical record at the hospital showing a
strong probability of active tuberculosis. However, the owner made
no investigation of the seaman's claim and did not even bother to
admit or deny the validity of it.5 As a result, for two years the
libellant was on his own and ultimately had to hire an attorney to
recover his claim. Though there was no precedent for allowing
counsel fees as damages in a maintenance and cure action, the Supreme Court followed the logic that admiralty courts were authorized to invoke equitable principles,' that there is precedent for allowing counsel fees in equity actions' and thus, that counsel fees might
be an appropriate element of recovery for maintenance and cure."
As to the test that the Supreme Court used to determine when
counsel fees could be recovered in maintenance and cure actions, at
least two distinct views have developed. In Vaughan, the Supreme
Court spoke of the "callous" attitude on the part of the shipowner
in "making no investigation of the libellant's claim" 9 and the default
of the shipowner "being willful and persistent."'" It was found
"difficult to imagine a clearer case of damages suffered for failure to
pay than this one."" In subsequent lower court decisions the problem arose whether a callous attitude on the part of the shipowner
was a prerequisite to recovery of counsel fees, or whether it merely
made the case for counsel fees stronger.
'The court definitely stated that the question involved damages and "not
the usual problem of what constitutes 'costs' in the conventional sense."
369 U.S. at 530.
Id.at 528.
'See, e.g., Rogers v. Paul, 232 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
T
See, e.g., Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,
339 U.S. 684 (1950); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824).
'Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962). See Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 291 F.2d 813, 816 (4th Cir. 1961) (dissent by Chief Judge
Sobeloff).
0 369 U.S. at 530.
10369 U.S. at 531.
"1369 U.S. at 531.
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The majority of the courts dealing with this have required a
finding of willful default or callous action by the shipowner before
2
an award of counsel fees is allowed in a maintenance and cure case.
This is perhaps a means of refraining from too radical a departure
from the general rule that counsel fees are not recoverable. 1 3 Thus,
a shipowner who paid maintenance to a seaman until the Public
Health Service certified the seaman as fit for duty was held not
liable for counsel fees because he had not acted in bad faith, callously, or unreasonably.' 4 Another shipowner, who depended on a
prediction by the Public Health Service that the libellant would be
fit for duty on a certain date, quit paying maintenance on that date
although the libellant had actually failed to recover. There was no
evidence that the shipowner knew of this, though there was never
any investigation by the shipowner to see if the seaman had in fact
recovered, or examination by the Public Health Service certifying
the seaman as fit for duty. Still, attorney's fees were denied because
the court could not say that the defendant acted in bad faith, callously, or unreasonably.' 5 In another case, a seaman who made no claim
for maintenance and cure prior to the institution of the lawsuit, was
denied counsel fees because there had been no default, willful or
otherwise, by the shipowner.' Many of these courts have specifically
rejected a more liberal interpretation of Vaughan and have considered a showing of callousness or recalcitrance on the part of the
" See notes 14-17 infra and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., McCoRMICK, DAMAGES §§ 61, 71 (1935).
"' Pyles v. American Trading & Prod. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.

Tex. 1965). The court held that good faith reliance on the Public Health

Service certification enabled the shipowner to suspend maintenance payments and remove the case from the rule of Vaughan. It stated that the
better authorities limited the Vaughan case to situations in which the defendant deliberately, flagrantly or unjustifiably refused to pay maintenance at
any time. Accord, Diddlebrock v. Alcoa Steamship Co., 234 F. Supp. 811,
814 1 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
Diaz v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court
pointed out that even a flat finding by the Public Health Service that the

seaman was fit for duty would not be conclusive evidence in court. The
court cited Koslusky v. United States, 208 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1953) and

Diniero v. United States Lines Co., 185 F. Supp. 818, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),

aff'd, 288 F.2d 595. Thus, a prediction that the libellant will be fit for duty

on a certain date would carry even less weight and could conceivable raise
the duty of the shipowner to investigate the libellant's claim to determine its
merit. An investigation might have clearly shown the libellant's right to

necessity of a lawsuit.
maintenance and cure and might have precludedF. the
Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1964).
' Connorton v. Harbor Towing Corp., 237
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shipowner a necessary requirement for recovery of attorney's fees.
These courts consider this the overwhelming majority view.1 7
Other courts have used language similar to the above test of
callousness or recalcitrance in speaking of the duty of a shipowner
to properly investigate the libellant's claim to determine its merits.' s
The Vaughan opinion noted this duty of the shipowner to properly
investigate and found that the shipowner had callously breached it.'9
The principal case developing the shipowner's duty to investigate a
claim for maintenance and cure with reasonable diligence was
Stewart v. S.S. Richmond." It found the shipowner's breach to be
arbitrary and unreasonable in the face of the overwhelming proof
of the merit of the claim. The libellant had presented the shipowner
an unfit for duty certificate from the Public Health Service along
with his own doctor's report that maximum cure had not been
reached. The court found that the shipowner was lax in investigating a claim which they would have found to have merit.2'
It seems possible that the duty to investigate could be negligently
breached by the shipowner, so that he could become liable for the
seaman's counsel fees without a specific showing of bad faith. However, there does not seem to be any authority specifically allowing
recovery of attorney's fees by the seaman for the shipowner's negligent failure to investigate the merits of the maintenance and cure
claim. But such a test would seem to be consistent with the liberal
policies in favor of the seaman enumerated by the courts in expanding the application of maintenance and cure.
Some courts have disregarded the requirements of willful default, callous action, or breach of duty to investigate as prerequisites
to the recovery of counsel fees in favor of a more liberal interpretation of Vaughan. These courts grant that bad faith by the ship"'Roberts v. S.S. Argentina, 359 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1966); cf. Johnson
v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 335 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1964).
"6See notes 19-21 infra and accompanying text.
10369 U.S. at 530.
0 214 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. La. 1963).

' When a claim for maintenance is made, there is an affirmative duty
upon the shipowner to investigate the claim with reasonable diligence ....

Moreover when there is substantial evidence that a ship-

owner is dilatory in making such an investigation or if it fails to make
an investigation which would have disclosed the merit of the seaman's

claim, the seaman may recover the damages resulting from the failure

to pay maintenance as well as attorney's fees incurred in getting the
maintenance from the shipowner.

Id. at 137.
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owner makes the case for counsel fees stronger, but feel it is not a
prerequisite to recovery. One group of opinions has interpreted
Vaughan as meaning counsel fees are discretionary with the court.
In Hurte v. Socony-Mobil Oil Co.,' the Eighth Circuit allowed
counsel fees in an action for maintenance and cure with no discussion other than that the libellant can recover attorney's fees for the
shipowner's failure to provide that to which the libellant was entitled. The court made no mention of the revelance of the shipowner's attitude or actions in dealing with the libellant's case. The
same judge, two years later, in awarding attorney's fees in another
action for maintenance and cure, simply stated that recovery was
discretionary with the court.m Under this interpretation of Vaughan,
recovery of counsel fees is not automatically required as a payment
of damages. Valid reasons might exist for not voluntarily paying a
claim. So long as the shipowner acted equitably with a bona fide
desire to comply with the law, and provided maintenance that was
justly and obviously due, damages by way of counsel fees would not
necessarily be allowed. 4 This interpretation of Vaughan seems to
be more in line with the policy favoring seamen in maintenance and
cure actions than the interpretation that callous actions on the part
of the shipowner must be shown before counsel fees are awarded.
The need for callous actions places a burden on the seaman to show
that the shipowner did indeed act callously, while the discretionary
or honest dispute interpretation would seem to generally assume that
counsel fees may be awarded in maintenance and cure actions. This
would place on the shipowner the burden of showing that he is
within the exception of not being liable for counsel fees because he
acted equitably and an honest dispute did exist.
An even more radical departure from the requirement of a
showing of callous action by the shipowner has been made by some
courts. This is the theory of allowing the seaman to recover his
counsel fees anytime he is forced to litigate his claim for mainte2'221 F. Supp. 885, 890 (E.D. Mo. 1963). See Smith v. Seitter, 225 F.
Supp. 282, 287 (E.D.N.C. 1964) ; Sims v. Marine Catering Serv., Inc., 217
F. Supp. 511 (D. La. 1963).
" Rowald v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 629, 633 (E.D. Mo.
1965).
" The intention and purpose of the Supreme Court in Vaughan was that
"the trial court should make the seaman 'whole,' i.e. he should not be
required to pay money out of his pocket to collect maintenance lawfully due
him." Vaughan v. Atkinson, 206 F. Supp. 575, 576 (E.D. Va. 1962) (on
remand).
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nance and cure. The payment of counsel fees by the shipowner in
a litigated maintenance and cure claim is felt by such courts to be
an automatic obligation that does not turn on the issue of the shipowner's recalcitrance. The main case espousing this interpretation
of Vaughan is Jordan v. Norfolk Dredging Co. 5 There, according
to the libellant and the finding of the court, Jordan had injured his
back while aboard ship five or six months before his employment
was terminated. He then reinjured his back before he left the ship
and was able to continue work only with the help of his fellow deckhands. However, no complaint of back trouble was ever made to
officials of the operating company until one month after the libellant
had quit work. After Jordan made his claim, a company representative told him it was doubtful whether he was entitled to maintenance
and cure and as a result, Jordan had to litigate his claim to recover.
The court expressed grave doubts that there was any callous behavior
on the part of the shipowner toward the libellant. However, it felt
that the Supreme Court in Vaughan had expressly rejected the recovery of counsel fees on the basis of unconscionable behavior by the
shipowner."8 The court admitted that the Supreme Court did refer to
callous, willful and persistent behavior, and that the language of the
Vaughan opinion was not clear, but defended its view in light of the
policies and authority upon which the decision restedY
" 223 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. Va. 1963). This case was tried in the same

district in which the Vaughan case was originally tried and to which it was
remanded.
20223 F. Supp. at 82.
The court placed heavy reliance on Sims v. United States of America
War Shipping Administration, 186 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
816 (1951), in which consequential damages were included in a recovery
for maintenance and cure. In Sims the shipowner's good faith did not save
him from liability; the court drawing an analogy to tort law in which
a wrongdoer hurts another in an accident but fails to provide medical
care or to alleviate the harm honestly thinking that (1) he was not
himself negligent or (2) the victim was contributorily negligent. If
the trier of facts disagrees with the actor on these conclusions, the
defendant is liable for full damages suffered, although some of them
could have been mitigated by prompt action of his part.
Id. at 974, 975.
However, in Sims the consequential damages from the withholding of the
maintenance and cure were physical as a prolongation of the seaman's illness and no mention was made of monetary damages in the form of counsel
fees. It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Vaughan did not cite
the Sins opinion or use the phrase 'consequential damages.' Nevertheless,
the Jordan court felt that counsel fees had been brought within the sphere
of consequential damages in maintenance and cure action. 223 F. Supp. at

83.
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Apparently the Supreme Court intended to put shipowners
on notice that if, in any case, they saw fit to contest a claim for
maintenance and cure, regardless of the reasonableness of the
grounds upon which the refusal to pay is based, and if it was
ultimately determined on the merits that maintenance and cure
was indeed owing, then counsel fees should be paid as compensation for 'necessary expenses' incurred. In other words, attorney's
fees have been made a routine element of damages to be paid
any seaman who wins a contested maintenance and cure suit.
Apparently this added and unusual onus is put on the shipowners' shoulders in maintenance and cure actions in an attempt
to equalize the always poor and usually ignorant seaman with
the powerful, wealthy, and well-informed shipping company which
is better able to evaluate the legal merits of a claim and to pay
the, to them, relatively small
amounts usually involved in mainte28
nance and cure actions.
In the Gore case, the court did not require a finding of recalcitrance by the shipowners before counsel fees could be awarded."0
There was, however, no express statement that the recovery of counsel fees was treated as an automatic obligation to be placed on a
shipowner in any litigated maintenance and cure claim. In allowing
the seaman to recover counsel fees in one of the actions, the court
did not permit the shipowner to escape liability due to the fact that
he in good faith believed that ultimate responsibility for the maintenance and cure rested with another shipowner." Against another
shipowner counsel fees were awarded with the statement that the
shipowner failed to pay maintenance concurrently with the need."1
In the discussion as to whether secondarily liable shipowners could
recover from primarily liable shipowners counsel fees paid to the
seaman, the court made a strong argument in favor of a liberal
interpretation of Vaughan. Citing the Jordan opinion, the court said
that "the awarding of counsel fees in all these cases is a corollary
of the strong policy of the admiralty law favoring prompt payment
2

1Id.at 83.
"0Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
"' When a seaman leaves any ship after he has become disabled, the ship
that he leaves is responsible for providing maintenance and cure. See, e.g.,
GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-8, at 257 (1957); 1 NoRRis, SEAMAN
§ 568 (2d ed. 1962); ROBINsON, ADMIRALTY § 36, at 292 (1939).
3 Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 104, 116 n.9 (E.D.
Pa. 1966). The court did note that Public Health Service records dearly
indicated the merits of the libellant's claim which could be construed to
raise an inference of bad faith.
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of maintenance claims."
Although there was evidence that ruled
out any contention that the primarily liable shipowner was acting in
bad faith, the court assessed counsel fees as damages under a policy
of encouraging shipowners to pay maintenance claims rapidly, and
discouraging the denial to seamen of just claims for long periods
while competing shipowners, or a court, resolved the issue of ultimate responsibility.3 3 Thus, this court seems to have adopted a very
liberal position in favor of seamen in the awarding of counsel fees
in maintenance and cure cases.
The Supreme Court has not yet clarified its position on this
issue, but the liberal policy considerations lying behind the action
for maintenance and cure3 4 make it seem probable that it will adopt
a rule similar to the language of the Gore opinion. There could
conceivably be a dispute over a maintenance and cure claim where
the shipowner acted with the highest equitable regard toward the
seaman's rights, but the seaman failed to cooperate in an investigation of the merits of the claim. Thus, the obligation on the shipowner to pay counsel fees should not be absolute and automatic in
any contested maintenance and cure action that the shipowner loses.
In such a situation where the equities lie on the side of the shipowner in the parties' attempt to settle prior to the litigation, the shipowner should not be responsible for the seaman's counsel fees. 5
GEORGE

V. HANNA, III

"Id. at 125.
"Id. at 126.
"Vaughan v. Atkinson, 206 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Va. 1962) (on remand).
"Allowing the recovery of counsel fees as damages has also raised other
problems. For example, most courts speak of reasonable counsel fees. In
Vaughan, on remand, the district court held that a fifty per cent contingent
fee contract could not be approved. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 206 F. Supp. 575
(E.D. Va. 1962). Other courts have allowed fees of thirty-three and onethird per cent of the recovery. See Rowald v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 243 F.
Supp. 629 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Hurte v. Socony-Mobile Oil Co., 221 F. Supp.
885 (E.D. Mo. 1963). However, if counsel fees are to be considered
damages, who should determine the reasonableness? Should a lawyer be
permitted to set his own fee or should it be determined by a judge or jury?
In allowing recovery for reasonable counsel fees in Gore, the court held
that if counsel could not agree on the amount of fee then affidavits should be
filed by each side with the court in support of their claims. The court would
then make a determination. 256 F. Supp. at 127 n.32. In Burkert v.
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 350 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1965), the court directed an
award of counsel fees incurred by seaman on his appeal in an amount the
district court thought reasonable. Other problems may well arise if the
policy of allowing counsel fees in maintenance and cure cases is extended to
seamen's actions based on unseaworthiness. See BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF
THE SUPREME COURT

§ 1-7 (1963).

